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Off-farm Work, Technical Efficiency, and Production Risk: Empirical Evidence
from a National Farmer Survey in Taiwan
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to investigate the differences in yield production,
production efficiency, and yield risk for farmers with and without off-farm work.
Using a nationwide survey of Taiwanese rice farmers, we estimate a stochastic
production frontier model accommodating the technical inefficiency and the
production risk simultaneously.Applying the stochastic dominance criterion to rank
the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between professional farmers and
farmers with off-farm jobs, our empirical analysis shows that off-farm work is
significantly associated with lower technical efficiency.Additionally, farmers with
off-farm work face higher production risks. Comparing the marginal effects of input
uses on technical inefficiency and yield risk between these groups of farmers, we
found a substantial heterogeneity of input uses between these two groups of farmers.
Key words: Off-farm work, technical efficiency, production risk, Taiwan.2
Introduction
Off-farm work by farm households is a persistent phenomenon in most
countries, and the dependence of farm families on the income from off-farm work has
increased steadily over years. To improve the wellbeing of farm households, it is
necessary to have a better understanding of the nonfarm business of farm households.
The importance of off-farm work has been widely acknowledged and the empirical
evidence has been revealed in many countries. For example, according to the
summary of historical data reported by the United States Department ofAgriculture
(USDA), the rate of U.S farm households that work off-farm is approximately 65% on
average (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007). Income from off-farm activities has been shown
as a primary source of total farm household income. Similar evidence has also been
found in Taiwan. Based on the statistics summarized from theAgricultural Census
data in 2001, approximately 75% of the farm households have reported wages or
income from an off-farm job.
In light of the increasing prominence of off-farm labor as a crucial determinant
of farm household income, attention has been paid to the interaction between the farm
practice and off-farm work. It is expected that the increased reliance on off-farm
employment may affect the allocation of family labor, thus have influences on farm3
productivity. On the other hand, off-farm work provides an opportunity for farm
households to stabilize household income and reduce uncertainty associated with
agricultural production. It is a generally held belief that engaging in the off-farm labor
market provides a risk management tool to reduce the income variability for the farm
household.
Some of the previous studies have investigated the impacts of off-farm work
on farm productivity. For instance, by estimating a stochastic production frontier
model, Kumbhakar et al. (1989) examined the effects of off-farm income on
farm-level efficiency of dairy farms in the United States. Their results show that
off-farm work is negatively associated with the technical efficiency. Using a similar
approach to the vegetable farm survey in Florida, Fernandez-Cornejo (1992) found
similar results.Also, Goodwin and Mishra (2004) used the gross cash income over the
total variable costs as a simple proxy for the farm efficiency and analyzed the
relationship between the off-farm labor supply and farm productivity. Their results
also show that those farm households who work off the farm are less efficient.
On the other hand, past studies have pointed out that farm households may
treat off-farm work as a vehicle to stabilize their income (i.e. Mishra and Goodwin,
1997). This is due to the fact that farm commodity prices are more variable than4
off-farm wages. As predicted by the economic theory, a risk averse farmer will
allocate labor and other resources to the less risky income sources (i.e. the off-farm
work) until the expected marginal returns are equal between available activities.As a
result, the reduction of the income risk of farm production may drive farmers to
engage in the off-farm labor market.
Our study contributes to the previous studies of the off-farm work in several
aspects. Unlike the previous studies on the examination of the effects of off-farm
work on farm efficiency, we consider both technical efficiency and production risk
simultaneously. As we have stated earlier, off-farm work may provide a useful tool for
risk management. Incorporating production risk into the stochastic production frontier
framework is crucial since the main purpose of this type analysis is to predict the
technical efficiency of each individual farmer, which measures the ability of the
farmer to adopt technology, and production risk may affect the decision making of
this process. Therefore, ignoring production risks may result in misleading policy
implications. The second objective of this paper is to highlight the potential farm
heterogeneity by examining the marginal effects of exogenous variables on
inefficiency and risk functions. We investigate if the marginal effects of input use on
efficiency are monotonically increasing, and how it may differ between farmers with5
and without off-farm work.
Using the nationwide survey of the rice farmers in Taiwan, we first estimate two
stochastic production frontier functions accounting for production risk for two groups
of farmers: those without off-farm work, and those whose income from the off-farm
work dominates the income from farming. With the consistent estimates of the
production parameters, we then calculate the technical efficiencies and risk terms for
these two groups of farmers. Instead of comparing the technical efficiencies and risk
on the mean values between these two groups of farmers, we compare the
distributions of these two indexes (i.e., efficiency and risk) by the stochastic
dominance criterion. By doing so, we are able to examine the extent to which
efficiencies and risk may be associated with farmer’ s off-farm work.
This paper is structured as follows. We first outline the econometric strategy and
the following section introduces the data used in this study. The presentation of results
includes: the estimations of the production functions, the marginal effects of the
factors on the inefficiency and risk functions, and a discussion of the distributional
differences of efficiency and risk between two groups of farmers. The conclusions
from this study are the final section in this paper.6
Econometric Strategy
The empirical strategy proposed in this study includes two steps. In the first
step, we estimate two stochastic production frontier models for two groups of rice
farmers. The first group of farmers is those without off-farm work, while the second
group of farmers is those who engage in part-time jobs. Given the consistent estimates
of the technical efficiency and risk terms of farmers in each group, we then compare
the distributions of the technical efficiency and risk by group based on the stochastic
dominance criterion.
Estimating the Stochastic Frontier Model with Risk
The stochastic frontier model we estimated is an extension of the standard
frontier model by allowing heterogeneity risk terms (Battese, Rambaldi, and Wan,
1997; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Wang, 2002). Following the approach in Wang
(2002), the econometric specification of the production function can be shown as:
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where yi is production yield, and vi and ui are random error and inefficiency term,
respectively. Following the conventional set-up in the stochastic production frontier7
models, the inefficient term ui follows the truncated-normal distribution with mean
u and variance
2
u  , and the random error vi follows the normal distribution with zero
mean and variance
2
v  . To capture the heterogeneity of the efficiency and risk terms,
the mean and variance functions of the efficiency and risk term are determined by
exogenous factors. Furthermore, consistent with Wang (2002) and Battese, Rambaldi,
and Wan (1997), the variance functions are assumed to be an exponential functional
form. The exponential specification is also widely used in the Just-Pope production
function (Just and Pope, 1979). The vector xi, zi, hi, ki are exogenous variables that
affect the deterministic frontier, unobservable variance (i.e. risk), and the mean and
variance of the technical inefficiency, respectively. The consistent estimators of
equation (1) can be obtained by using the maximum likelihood method on the
following log-likelihood function:
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It is worth mentioning that the general specification of equation (2) is testable for
several special cases. Testing the null hypothesis H0: 0   ; H0: 0  l , and H0: 0  
provides the statistical justification if technical inefficiency and risk functions exhibit
heteroscedasticity. These hypotheses can be empirically tested on the null hypothesis.8
Since equation (2) is estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation method,
likelihood ratio test can be used for testing the null hypothesis.
Based on the consistent estimates of equation (2), the marginal effects of the
exogenous factors on the technical efficiency and the risk term can be further derived.
The marginal effects, which measure the changes of exogenous factors on the mean
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where ui i z    /  , m1 and m2 are the first two moments of ui.
One of the advantages utilizing the general version of the stochastic production
frontier model can be easily seen in equation (3)-(4). The marginal effects of the
exogenous factors on the mean and variance functions are not restricted to be
necessarily monotonic. Instead, both the positive and negative effects on the
production efficiency may exist. The signs and magnitudes of the marginal effects
depend on the value of the exogenous determinants. On the other hand, the effect of













Since one of the primary objectives of this paper is to see whether yield risk or
production efficiency drives the farmers to work off the farm, we compare the
estimated technical efficiency and risk term between these two groups of farmers
(professional farmers and farmers working off the farm). Regarding the technical
efficiency estimates of each group as a distribution, the differences in distributions of
these two technical efficiencies/risk variances can be compared based on the
stochastic dominance criterion.
The stochastic dominance analysis has been developed to compare and rank
the outcomes of alternative distributions. The comparison and ranking is based on
cumulative density functions (CDFs). The two dominance rules discussed below are
first order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second order stochastic dominance (SSD)
analysis. Assume off-farm work is associated with the distribution of technical
efficiency and risk, and the cumulative distribution functions of these two technical
efficiencies are given by P(TE) and NP(TE) for professional farmers and off-farm
farmers, respectively. The technical efficiency of the professional farmer group
dominates non-participant group in the sense of the FSD iff
(6) 0 ) ( ) (   TE P TE NP , R TE  
with inequality for some R TE  .If equation (6) stands, it implies that the CDF of10
technical efficiency of professional farmers is greater than the CDF of technical
efficiency of the part-time farmer group for all range of the technical efficiency levels.
(Chavas, 2004). In graph, the NP(TE) is on the left to the P(TE). Alternatively, if
these two CDF of technical efficiencies/risk intersect, FSD cannot discriminate
between these two alternatives.
If there is no FSD relation between these two distributions, a choice between
distributions could be made by the Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SSD)
criterion (Hien et al. 1997). Formally, NP(TE) dominates P(TE) in the SSD sense iff
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with strict inequality for some R TE  . In the graph, SSD test requires a comparison
of the area under these two CDF (NP(TE) and P(TE)). If equation (7) holds, SSD
requires that the area under P(TE) is always smaller than the area under NP(TE).
Data
Data used in this analysis were taken from the rice farmer survey in Taiwan. This
survey is conducted by the Counsel ofAgriculture (CoA) in Taiwan annually since
1980. In each year, approximately 1,000 farmers are randomly selected and
interviewed. The primary focus of this survey is to understand the production and cost11
structure of the rice production, and each individual farmer in this survey is requested
to report details of the production input use.Although the information of production
input and output are revealed, the socio-economic characteristics of farmer or farm
household are not investigated. In the recent two waves conducted in year 2005 and
2006, in addition to the input uses of rice production, each individual farmer is asked
if he engages in any off-farm job during the production seasons. This information
allows us to distinguish two groups of rice farmers: those without off-farm work, and
those whose incomes from off-farm jobs are more than their farm revenues.
1
To increase sample size and validation of the empirical analysis, we combine the
recently available waves in year 2005 and 2006. The total sample includes 2,073 rice
farmers, but not all of the selected farmers provide full information of input uses.
After deleting these missing values, the final sample account for 1,848 rice farmers.
Among these rice farmers, 1,326 of them reported that their incomes from other
off-farm jobs are larger than their farm revenues. In other words, 72% of the rice
farmers are involving in the part-time job, and only 28% of them don’ t work off the
farm. The high proportion of farmers that involve in the off-farm labor market is
consistent with the findings in other countries.
1 Detail information of each rice farmer’ s income is confidential, the only available information we
have related to off-farm work is whether the incomes from off-farm work are larger than their incomes
from the farm revenues. Therefore, we can only category the entire sample into two groups of farmers.12
Output variable is defined as the production yield (i.e. production per hectare),
and production inputs are categorized into several groups. Labor inputs are measured
by the hours spending on the rice production. Consistent with Dhungana, Nuthall, and
Nartea (2004) and Audibert (1997), we distinguish the self-provided labor hours and
the working hours of hired labor to control for labor quality on yield production. The
input expenses per acre for machinery and equipments are measured as the flow value
of capital. Per acre expenses of fertilizer and pesticides are also specified. We
distinguish the fertilizer and pesticide expenses due to the fact that these two inputs
have different implications for yield risk. In addition to the production input,
environmental characteristics are also included in the analysis. To take the
environmental characteristics into account is important since it is a general belief that
environmental factors are significant determinants or sources of production risk.
Three variables are specified to represent local environmental characteristics: the
average rainfall, temperature and soil quality. These variables are aggregated on the
county level. The quality of soil is identified by the Geographic Information System,
conducted by theAgricultural Engineering Research Center in Taiwan. Ahigher score
of the soil quality represents a better land quality. The sample statistics of the selected
variables, separated by two groups of farmers, are exhibited in Table 1.13
Since the primary focus of this study is to examine the differences in rice
production between farmers who work off the farm and those who don’ t, we first look
at the differences in production yields. The average yields of production for
professional farmers and part-time farmers are 5,773 kg/ha and 5,547 kg/ha
respectively. This shows that rice farmers who don’ t work off the farm have higher
yield. It also appears that off-farm work is negatively associated with the variance of
the production yield since the standard errors of yields of professional and part-time
farmers are 1,324 and 1,228 kg/ha, respectively. This finding can be reinforced in
Figure 1 in that the yield distribution for farmers who work off the farm is more flat.
With respect to the differences of input uses between these two groups of farmers, it
appears that farmers who work off the farm use less labor, fertilizer, pesticides, and
capital (Table 1). Also, the average values of rainfall and temperature around the area
that these groups of farmers located are higher than the other groups of farmers.
Empirical Results
The empirical results are presented in several sets. First, the estimations of the
stochastic production frontier model are discussed (Table 2). Table 3 and 4 present the
marginal effects of the exogenous factors on the technical inefficiency and risk14
functions. The distributional statistics of the estimated technical efficiencies and the
risk terms are exhibited in Table 5.
Specification Tests of the Inefficiency and Risk functions
We begin our discussion of the results on the specification tests of interests
(the bottom in Table 2). Two null hypotheses are tested to justify if the distinction
between technical inefficiency and risk term are appropriate in the rice production
function. The first null hypothesis tests if the effects of the exogenous determinants on
the mean and variance functions are statistically equal to zero. If the null hypothesis
holds, the model is identical to the Just-Pope risk production function. The test
statistics of the likelihood ratio test are 41 and 135 for the professional farmer and
off-farm farmer groups, respectively. Since both of them are higher than the critical
values in the conventional significant level (x
2(0.95,10)=18.3), our results provide
statistical evidence for the heteroskedasticity of the inefficiency functions. On the
other hand, the appropriate accommodation of the risk function can be justified by
testing the null hypothesis if the effects of the exogenous variables on the risk
function are statistically equal to zero. If the null hypothesis holds, the model is
identical to the conventional stochastic production frontier specification. The test
statistics of the likelihood ratio test are 127, 170 for groups of professional farmers15
and off-farm farmers, respectively. Since both of the null hypotheses are rejected at
the 5% level or higher (x
2(0.95,8)=15.5), empirical results are supportive to consider
the risk function in the empirical analysis.
Estimations of the Production Frontier Model
The deterministic parts of the rice production function are specified as the
Cobb-Douglas functional form.
2 As Cobb-Douglas forms were used to illustrate
farmers’ production behavior, the estimated parameters represent the input-output
elasticities of the rice production in Taiwan. All coefficients are positive in the
deterministic frontier function, but different elasticities of labor and capital inputs are
found for these two groups of farmers.Although self-labor variables for both
professional and off-farm farmers are statistically significant at 5% level or higher, the
elasticity of the rice yields with respective to self-labor is 5.5% higher for professional
farmers than its counterparts. With respect to the effects from the hired-labor, results
show that the employment of the hired-labor has positive and significant effects on
rice yields for off-farm farmers while the estimation results cannot reject the
hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero for professional farmers. In
2 In the preliminary analysis, we estimated the more general translog production functions. However,
most of the second order terms are not significant. Additionally, the calculated input elasticities
calculated based on the estimates of the translog forms are negative for some input at certain data
points. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production functions are chosen.16
addition to the effects of the self-labor and the hired-labor input, the yields of rice
production for professional and off-farm farmers also response differently to
machinery and equipments uses. The coefficient of capital shows that the use of
machinery has positive and significant impact on rice production for professional
farmers; the rice yield raises 18% when the farmer increases 1% of money
investments in machinery and equipment use. Therefore, we may conclude that the
rice yields of off-farm farmers are more responsive to the hired-labor variable and the
professional farmers benefit more from the use of machinery and equipments, while
both professional and off-farm rice farmers in Taiwan relies significantly on the
employment of self-labor.
The estimated input elasticities are also compared to the empirical evidence of
the rice production of the previous studies (e.g., Audibert, 1997; Huang and Kalirajan,
1997; Fuwa et al. 2007). Our results show that the output elasticity of self-labor is
higher than that of hired-labor (0.189 versus 0.011 for professional farmers; 0.134
versus 0.037 for off-farm farmers), which is consistent withAudibert (1997). When
comparing the input elasticities for professional farmers in our research with previous
studies, the output elasticity with respect to machinery use in our study (0.188) is
larger than the findings in Huang and Kalirajan (1997). In addition, the elasticity of17
fertilizer in our study (0.083) is within the elasticity range reported in Huang and
Kalirajan (1997) and Fuwa et al. (2007)
3.
Estimation Results for Technical Inefficiency and Risk Functions
The estimation results of the mean and variance functions of technical
inefficiencies and the variance function of risks are reported in Table 2 as well. The
coefficients in mean and variance functions of inefficiency indicate how exogenous
variables influence the expected level and the stability of technical inefficiencies,
respectively.
For the professional farmers, the positive coefficient of self-labor in the mean
function indicates that it has negative impact on production efficiency while its
positive coefficient in the variance function (of inefficiency) suggests that the
employment of self-labor decreases the variance of technical inefficiency. The
hired-labor, however, provides opposite impacts. When the professional farmers
increase the employment of hired-labor, the expected efficiency as well as the
3 Huang and Kalirajan (1997) applied a stochastic varying coefficients frontier approach to estimate
the household survey data in China from 1993 to 1995. The GLS results showed that the elasticities of
machinery vary between 0.11 (rice farmers in Sichuan in 1994) and 0.16 (rice farmers in Guangdong in
1993 and 1994), while the elasticities of fertilizer are between 0.08 (rice farmers in Sichuan in 1993)
and 0.15 (rice farmers in Sichuan in 1995). Fuwa et al. (2007) estimated stochastic frontier production
functions using the farm-level and plot-level rice data in eastern India. The empirical results found that
the elasticity of fertilizer ranges from 0.004 (lowland, traditional variety) to 0.0947 (upland, traditional
variety).18
variance of efficiency will increase at the same time.
For off-farm farmers, the impacts from self-labor and hired-labor on the
expected level and the stability of technical inefficiency have similar implications to
what have been found in the professional farmers model.Additionally, the use of
capital (pesticide) has a significant positive (negative) impact on the expected
technical efficiency, and the use of fertilizer decreases the stability of technical
efficiency of the off-farm farmers.
The parameter estimates in the variance function of risks indicate how
exogenous variables may influence production risks. In addition to the production
inputs, rainfall, temperature, and soil quality are included in the risk function to
accommodate the impacts of environmental conditions on production risks. Results
indicate that capital, pesticide, and soil quality are found to be risk-decreasing factors
for professional farmers while the hired-labor and rainfalls have significant positive
effect on the production risks.As for the off-farm farmers, temperature level and the
use of pesticide are statistically significant, but have opposite signs. Pesticide
expenditure is a risk-decreasing factor for the off-farm farmers while the production
risks goes up as temperature increase.
Marginal Effects of the Inefficiency and Risk Functions19
The relationship between technical efficiency and exogenous variables can be
discussed in details by measuring the marginal effects of each variable at different
percentiles of sample data. The estimation results of marginal effects are presented in
Table 4. For the sake of illustration, the marginal effects are depicted in Figures 2-3
by percentiles. Investigating the changes of the marginal effects by percentiles helps
to understand if the exogenous variables can have both positive and negative impacts
on production efficiency as the value of concerned variable varies (i.e. the
“ non-monotonic efficiency effects” , see Wang, 2002)
Due to the limited space, we only discuss the marginal effects of the
exogenous variables that are statistically significant in Table 2. For professional
farmers, self-labor and hired-labor are found to have non-monotonic efficiency effects.
The use of the first 50% percentile of self-labor is negatively associated with expected
inefficiency (i.e., efficiency-enhancing) but the sign of marginal effect turns positive
after that. The results for the hired-labor variable have a similar pattern except that the
use of first quartile of hired-labor has negative impacts on the expected inefficiency.
This implies that the use of excessive labor leads to disadvantages in the production
efficiency. The implication is also applicable to off-farm farmers.
For the off-farm farmers, capital is an efficiency-enhancing factor while the20
pesticide is efficiency-impeding. According to Figure 2, the magnitude of the
marginal effect of capital increases from the 5 percentile to the 95 percentile. This
indicates that the expected efficiency increases with the use of machinery and
equipments; however, the benefit diminishes as the use of machinery increases. The
marginal effect of pesticide, on the other hand, has an opposite pattern. The use of
pesticide has negative impact on the technical efficiency for off-farm farmers, and the
negative influence increases with the use of pesticide.
As for the marginal effects on the variance of technical inefficiency, Table 3
shows that, for professional farmers, the employment of the first 75 percentile of
self-labor and the first 10 percentile of hired-labor decreases the variance of technical
inefficiency; the self-labor and hired-labor increase the variance of inefficiency when
they are outside the above range. For off-farm farmers, the negative marginal effect of
self-labor on the variance of inefficiency indicate that the employment of self-labor
increase the stability of production efficiency, even though the stability benefit
decreases with the number of self-labor employees (Figure 3).Additionally,
hired-labor and fertilizer uses lead to an increase in the variance of efficiency, and the
magnitude of the marginal effect increases as the number of hired-labor or the use of
fertilizer increases.21
The marginal effects of the risk function are also calculated and the results
are reported in Table 4. The marginal effect on the risk function is monotonic since
the sign of the marginal effect depends on the sign of parameter estimates in the risk
function. For professional farmers, production risks decrease as the farmers use more
machinery and pesticide, or the soil of cultivated land has better quality. However, the
risk-reducing benefit of these three inputs decreases when the input use of the
concerned variable goes up. On the contrary, hired-labor and rainfall are
risk-increasing factors for professional farmers, and an increase in the employment of
hired-labor or the amount of rainfall will enhance the risk-increasing effect.
As for the off-farm farmers, pesticide is a risk-reducing factor while
temperature has significant positive impact on production risks. The results reported
in table 4 and the marginal effect pattern illustrated in Figure 4 point out that the
risk-reducing benefit from pesticide decrease as it is used more intensively; the
risk-increasing effect from the temperature increases as the temperature goes up.
Comparing the distributions of technical efficiency and risk between groups
The technical efficiency level of each farmer can be measured by comparing
its actual rice yields to the reference production frontier. Table 5 reports the sample
statistics of technical efficiency by percentiles for professional and off-farm farmers.22
The average efficiency level is 0.835 for professional farmers and 0.791 for off-farm
farmers. At every selected percentile, professional farmers are generally more
efficient than off-farm farmers. For example, the average technical efficiency for the
first 25% of the professional farmers is 0.778, which is larger than that of the off-farm
farmers (0.704). This indicates a first-order stochastic dominance of the professional
farmers over the off-farm farmers. The relationship of the technical efficiency
between these two groups of farmers can be better understood using the cumulated
density functions (CDF) illustrated in Figure 5. It is obvious that the CDF of
professional farmers lies entirely below the CDF of off-farm farmers. Let e ~ denotes
an arbitrary efficiency level, and Figure 5 demonstrates an inequality relationship that
the proportion of off-farm farmers with efficiency level less than or equal to e ~ is no
less than the proportion of such professional farmers. For example, the proportion of
off-farm farmers with efficiency level less than or equal to 0.8 is larger than the
proportion of professional farmers with the same criteria. That is, there is always
more production inefficiency in off-farm farmers than in professional farmers.As
such, the conclusion that the technical efficiency of professional farmers dominates
that of off-farm farmers can be drawn.
The distribution of risk terms for professional farmers and off-farm farmers23
is also reported in Table 5. The average risk variance is 0.018 for the professional rice
farmers and 0.011 for the off-farm farmers. For the first 25 percentile of professional
farmers and off-farm farmers, the risk variance has higher value for off-farm farmers
than it is for professional farmers, but the direction of inequality reverses as we move
from the 25 percentile to the 95 percentile.Although the values of the risk variance
are small for both professional and off-farm farmers, the characteristics of the
second-order stochastic dominance can be observed from here. The CDFs for
professional and off-farm farmers are illustrated in Figure 6. We can see that the CDF
of off-farm farmers cross the CDF of professional farmers when the risk variance is
around 0.01. The CDF of professional farmers is higher before the crossing point and
then become lower after that. We can say that the risk variance of off-farm farmers
dominates that of professional farms according to the second-order stochastic
dominance. In this case, although the first 25% percentile of off-farm farmers face
more production risks than that of professional farmers, the distribution of risk
variance for off-farm farmers are more concentrated and skewed to the right, meaning
that in general the off-farm farmers in Taiwan face less production risks than the
professional farmers.24
Concluding Remarks
It is a general belief that the off-farm salary account for a high proportion of the total
farm household income, and empirical evidence has been provided by studies in many
countries. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the differences of yield
production between two groups of farmers: those who don’ t work off the farm, and
those whose incomes from off-farm salary are higher than farm revenues. Specifically,
we examine the differences in input use, the technical inefficiency and production risk
between these two groups of farmers.
In contrast to previous studies on the similar topic, our study can be
distinguished in several aspects. First, we distinguish the effects of technical
inefficiency and production risk on yield production function.Additionally, by
specifying the heteroskedasticity form of the inefficiency and risk functions, we
investigate if the marginal effects of the input uses and other environmental
characteristics on the mean, variance function of inefficiency, and the risk function are
monotonic. Finally, we also rank the estimated technical efficiencies and risk
distributions of these two groups of farmers by applying the stochastic dominance
criterion.25
Using national survey of Taiwanese rice farmers in 2005 and 2006, our results
reveal some interesting findings. First, different patterns of input uses are found for
these two groups of farmers. Input elasticities of part-time farmers are higher for hired
labors and pesticide expenditures. The marginal effects of exogenous variables on
inefficiency and risk terms also differ. The non-monotonic efficiency is found of
self-labor and hired-labor uses for professional farmers. For farmers who work off the
farm, capital is an efficiency-enhancing factor while the pesticide is
efficiency-impeding. The marginal effect of pesticide, on the other hand, has an
opposite pattern. With respect to the risk functions, the effects of input uses on yields
are also different between farmers with and without off-farm work. For professional
farmers, machinery and pesticide uses are risk decreasing, but hired-labor and rainfall
are risk increasing. However, the story is somehow different for the off-farm farmers.
Pesticide expenditure is associated with risk reducing while temperature has
significant positive impact on production risks.
With respect to the differences in the distributions of technical efficiency and risk,
results indicate that the technical efficiencies of the farmers working off the farm are
lower than farmers without off-farm work. This result is robust across the entire
distribution. However, the story is somehow different for yield risk. When facing26
minor yield risk, there is no significant difference between these two groups of
farmers. Instead, for the relatively low yield risk, farmers with off-farm work face less
risk than those without off-farm work. As a result, we may conclude that technical
inefficiencies are more significant that drive farmers to work off the farm.27
Table 1: Sample statistics
Farm type Professional Off-farm
Sample 522 1326
Labels Definitions Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Output and input variables
yield yield (kg/ha) 5773 1324 5547 1228
hour_selflabor hours of self-labor (hr/ha) 135 31 130 32
hour_hirelabor hours of hired labor (hr/ha) 4.02 2.49 3.80 3.19
capital machinery and equipment (NT$/ha) 253 45 251 47
pesticide pesticide per ha (NT$/ha) 8088 3570 6985 3532
fertilizer fertilizer expense per ha (NT$/ha) 8337 2629 7704 2535
Environmental characteristics (county level)
rainfall average rainfall 170 30 173 31
temperature average temperature 22.23 1.76 22.56 1.55
soil soil quality 3.59 0.07 3.63 0.0828
Table 2: Estimations of the rice production functions
Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev.
log(hour_selflabor) 0.189 0.066 0.134 0.059
log(hour_hirelabor) 0.011 0.007 0.037 0.012
log(capital) 0.188 0.037 0.009 0.031
log(pesticide) 0.113 0.021 0.137 0.017
log(fertilizer) 0.083 0.036 0.061 0.031
constant 4.343 0.528 6.341 0.445
log(hour_selflabor) 2.249 0.728 0.640 0.162
log(hour_hirelabor) -0.269 0.122 -0.073 0.031
log(capital) 0.359 0.330 -0.326 0.076
log(pesticide) 0.275 0.212 0.272 0.069
log(fertilizer) 0.669 0.431 -0.011 0.070
constant -23.491 9.145 -2.156 1.071
log(hour_selflabor) -2.571 0.390 -2.277 0.393
log(hour_hirelabor) 0.278 0.112 0.351 0.090
log(capital) -0.049 0.413 0.076 0.227
log(pesticide) 0.195 0.249 -0.015 0.152
log(fertilizer) -0.345 0.421 0.511 0.223
constant 12.461 5.650 3.017 3.244
log(hour_selflabor) 0.908 1.062 1.287 0.753
log(hour_hirelabor) 1.383 0.320 -0.128 0.150
log(capital) -1.744 0.538 -0.152 0.453
log(pesticide) -0.918 0.348 -0.799 0.183
log(fertilizer) 0.036 0.507 -0.404 0.385
rain_ave 4.178 1.062 0.248 0.633
temp_ave 2.600 1.513 10.180 2.069
soil -11.054 2.798 2.283 1.434
constant 46.986 12.193 -17.628 9.080
Log-likelihood
Specification tests
H0:   α = l =0*
H0:γ = 0 ** 127
test value
**All coefficients (except constant) in the risk function arezero. Critical value is x
2(0.95,8)=15.5
Off-farm farmers
Mean Function of Inefficiency
Variance Function of Inefficiency
Risk Function
Deterministic Frontier






*Allcoefficients (except constant) in the mean and variance of inefficiency functions arezero. Critical value is x
2(0.95,10)=18.329
Table 3: Distributional marginal effects of the inefficiency functions
Mean Function Variance Function Mean Function Variance Function
Percentile Professional Off-farm Professional Off-farm Professional Off-farm Professional Off-farm
log(hour_selflabor) log(fertilizer)
5% -0.349 -0.205 -0.147 -0.078 -0.019 0.011 -0.009 0.006
10% -0.277 -0.164 -0.099 -0.065 -0.008 0.023 -0.004 0.007
25% -0.148 -0.107 -0.048 -0.047 0.013 0.038 0.002 0.011
50% -0.065 -0.033 -0.024 -0.032 0.037 0.050 0.007 0.015
75% 0.025 0.122 -0.008 -0.019 0.064 0.062 0.012 0.019
90% 0.191 0.331 0.019 -0.011 0.113 0.071 0.021 0.024
95% 0.590 0.445 0.056 -0.007 0.228 0.077 0.031 0.027
log(hour_hirelabor) log(capital)
5% -0.074 -0.047 -0.008 0.002 0.016 -0.268 0.004 -0.025
10% -0.027 -0.032 -0.003 0.003 0.018 -0.234 0.005 -0.024
25% -0.007 -0.005 0.000 0.004 0.025 -0.169 0.006 -0.021
50% 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.007 0.039 -0.109 0.009 -0.017
75% 0.013 0.023 0.004 0.009 0.054 -0.072 0.012 -0.012
90% 0.028 0.032 0.010 0.012 0.079356 -0.051 0.017 -0.008
95% 0.036 0.037 0.015 0.014 0.139 -0.041 0.021 -0.006
log(pesticide)
5% 0.043 0.040 0.009 0.006
10% 0.047 0.048 0.010 0.007
25% 0.055 0.066 0.013 0.011
50% 0.062 0.097 0.016 0.015
75% 0.074 0.145 0.020 0.019
90% 0.095 0.198 0.025 0.022
95% 0.139 0.225 0.028 0.02330
Table 4: Distributional marginal effects on risk function
Professional Off-farm Professional Off-farm
Percentile log(hour_selflabor) log(capital)
5% 0.001 0.002 -0.088 -0.004
10% 0.002 0.004 -0.060 -0.003
25% 0.005 0.007 -0.038 -0.002
50% 0.010 0.013 -0.020 -0.002
75% 0.020 0.019 -0.009 -0.001
90% 0.031 0.028 -0.003 -0.001
95% 0.046 0.034 -0.002 0.000
log(hour_hirelabor) rainfall
5% 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.000
10% 0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.001
25% 0.007 -0.002 0.021 0.001
50% 0.016 -0.001 0.048 0.003
75% 0.030 -0.001 0.090 0.004
90% 0.048 0.000 0.144 0.005
95% 0.070 0.000 0.211 0.007
log(pesticide) temperature
5% -0.046 -0.021 0.002 0.014
10% -0.032 -0.017 0.005 0.034
25% -0.020 -0.012 0.013 0.059
50% -0.010 -0.008 0.030 0.105
75% -0.005 -0.005 0.056 0.151
90% -0.002 -0.003 0.090 0.219
95% -0.001 -0.001 0.131 0.267
log(fertilizer) soil
5% 0.000 -0.011 -0.558 0.003
10% 0.000 -0.009 -0.382 0.008
25% 0.000 -0.006 -0.238 0.013
50% 0.000 -0.004 -0.126 0.024
75% 0.001 -0.002 -0.056 0.034
90% 0.001 -0.001 -0.021 0.049
95% 0.002 -0.001 -0.010 0.06031
Table 5: Distributions of technical efficiency and risk terms
Technical Efficiency Risk Term
Professional Off-farm Professional Off-farm
Mean 0.835 0.791 0.018 0.011
Std. Dev. 0.116 0.131 0.030 0.008
Percentile
1% 0.471 0.441 0.000 0.001
5% 0.575 0.537 0.001 0.001
10% 0.680 0.599 0.002 0.003
25% 0.778 0.704 0.005 0.006
50% 0.872 0.824 0.011 0.010
75% 0.916 0.899 0.022 0.015
90% 0.941 0.933 0.035 0.022
95% 0.954 0.945 0.051 0.02632
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Figure 2: Distributions of the Marginal Effects of the Mean Function34
Figrue 3: Distributions of the Marginal Effects of the Variance Function35
Figrue 4: Distributions of the Marginal Effects of the Risk Function36
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